Appellate Court Expressions of Sympathy and the Case of the Nazi Floor
Imagine buying a new home. Excited to update the place, you decide to start by fixing up the basement. You pull up the rug… only to discover, to your horror, a tile floor featuring a swastika and Nazi eagle.
That is what happened in Wentworth v. Steinmetz, recently decided by the Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
The buyers, understandably upset, sued the seller. They contended he should have disclosed the floor’s awful imagery, and said they never would have bought the place had they known what was lurking in the basement.
The problem for the buyers was that Pennsylvania home sellers have to disclose only objectively-quantifiable “material defects.” This means physical flaws like a flood-prone basement, leaky roof, or termite-damaged wood. Sellers need not share cosmetic issues, no matter how upsetting. This is because courts have found it impossible to develop a standard to decide which of these constitute “material defects.” So, given the floor was still “functional,” the trial court decided it had to dismiss the case, despite the “disturbing” Nazi imagery.
The buyers appealed, but the Superior Court — holding its nose — found itself “compelled to concur” with the trial court. As the appellate court saw it, Pennsylvania law left no room for a different outcome. The basement floor’s impact on the home’s value was subjective and thus would “vary from person to person.” Some people, “sadly but undeniably,” would even find the Nazi floor an asset.
This was no doubt an uncomfortable case for the Superior Court’s judges to decide. No reasonable appellate judge would want to risk the perception of taking the “Nazi side” of any dispute, even if plainly untrue.
What can an appellate court do when faced with this kind of situation?
In Wentworth, the court offered condemnation of Nazi symbols and compassion for the buyers. The court deemed the floor a “crude mosaic” of “hate symbols” and “offensive imagery.” And it echoed the buyers’ sentiment that “there is probably no other symbol in American culture which is so widely reviled” as the swastika.
The court also pointed out that the buyers’ lawsuit was in itself a public vindication, even though it had been dismissed. As the court explained:
We are not dismissive of the Wentworths’ outrage, nor their concern that the existence of the images could taint them as Nazi supporters. With this lawsuit, however, they have made a public record to counter any supposition in that regard. Further, as the trial court observed, with pains not to minimize the enormity of the situation, the Wentworths can prevent people who come into the home from viewing the symbols by covering them or painting over them.
The Wentworth opinion is a good example of an appellate court’s justification in offering salutary expressions not necessary to decide the case or having the force of law. Given their nature, appellate courts can come off as distant, aloof and housed in ivory towers. But their judges are, of course, human beings. Nothing prevents these people from expressing their humanity to those who appear before them. (The words chosen must of course be measured, to avoid straying into an appearance of bias.) This telegraphs to disappointed parties that the judges are not cruel and heartless. It can ease a difficult outcome. The public sees this, too, and so these expressions also serve broader understanding. By these measured words, appellate judges sustain the parties’ and public’s confidence in our appellate courts.
