Wires Crossed: What is “Service” in the Context of Transmission Line Siting and Who Gets to Regulate It?

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania is poised to decide a narrow question with far‑reaching consequences for public utility regulation: who has authority to decide whether an electric utility acted reasonably when communicating with landowners potentially affected by planned construction of an electric transmission line? Is it the county courts, applying common‑law negligence standards on a county-by-county basis, or the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (PUC), applying the Public Utility Code and its own regulations on a statewide basis?

In Johnson v. Pa. PUC, the Commonwealth Court answered that question in favor of the courts, stripping the PUC of its jurisdiction over the dispute. The PUC and Duquesne Light Company (Duquesne) asked the Supreme Court to reverse, warning that the Commonwealth Court’s decision threatens to undermine the state’s regulatory framework and splinter the PUC’s transmission line siting authority. The Supreme Court granted review and is expected to hear arguments in the fall of 2026 and decide the matter in 2027.

From Property Purchase to Jurisdictional Showdown

The case was not born of a regulatory dispute, rather, as a real estate transaction gone sour.

In May 2017, Charles and Laura Johnson purchased a property in Indiana Township, Allegheny County. Prior to closing, Duquesne identified potential routes for the construction of a high-voltage transmission line as part of a wider regional reliability project. One of the routes was near the Johnsons’ new property.

Duquesne notified potentially impacted landowners of informational public meetings related to the project in June 2017 and sent notices of eminent domain rights in Sept. 2017, as required by the PUC’s regulations. The Johnsons alleged that they only learned of the transmission‑line project after they had moved in, and that the ensuing uncertainty — particularly the eminent‑domain notice — placed a “cloud” on their property that depressed its value and impeded resale. Although the route near their property was never selected by Duquesne, and although the Johnsons ultimately sold the property in 2020 for more than they paid, they contended that they lost prospective buyers and incurred carrying costs during the pendency of the proposed transmission line project.

In 2019, the Johnsons sued Duquesne in the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, asserting “negligence and recklessness” due to Duquesne’s alleged failure to notify them or their predecessors in title of the potential transmission line project prior to the Johnsons’ purchase of the property. In response, Duquesne, among other things, invoked the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, arguing that questions about a utility’s duties in planning and communicating about transmission‑line siting and construction were within the PUC’s exclusive competence. The trial court agreed, bifurcating and staying the negligence action and directing the parties to obtain a determination from the PUC regarding Duquesne’s duties and the reasonableness of its conduct.

After unsuccessful attempts to secure interlocutory appellate review, the Johnsons filed a formal complaint with the PUC “under protest,” reiterating that their suit involved purely common‑law tort claims and that the PUC lacked jurisdiction to consider them. Ultimately, the PUC disagreed, concluding in late 2023 that it did have jurisdiction because the Johnsons’ allegations implicated the reasonableness of “service” under Section 1501 of the Public Utility Code and the PUC’s transmission‑line siting and eminent‑domain notice regulations. The Johnsons sought reconsideration, which the PUC denied. Thereafter, the Johnsons’ complaint was formally dismissed by the PUC after the Johnsons failed to pursue the complaint on its merits.

The Johnsons then petitioned the Commonwealth Court. In April 2025, the Commonwealth Court sided with the Johnsons in a precedential decision. It concluded that neither the Code’s definition of “service” nor the PUC’s transmission line siting or eminent‑domain regulations precluded the civil court from evaluating whether Duquesne breached its common-law duties under negligence principles. Because the Johnsons’ claims targeted the timing and extent of the notice, rather than electrical operations, the court held that the challenged conduct did not constitute “service” under Section 1501. The court further characterized the dispute as a non‑complex, fact‑specific negligence claim suitable for judicial resolution and unlikely to produce a regulatory patchwork.

The PUC sought review by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which granted allowance of appeal on Dec. 31, 2025.

The Johnsons: Common‑Law Tort Gets You into Court

The Johnsons’ position is straightforward. They argue that they never alleged a violation of the Public Utility Code, any PUC regulation, a PUC order or Duquesne’s PUC-approved Tariff — the PUC-approved documents that govern individual utilities’ rules and rates.  Therefore, according to the Johnsons, the PUC does not have jurisdiction to hear their claims.

Instead, they assert common‑law negligence and recklessness grounded in duties owed by any reasonable actor under Pennsylvania tort law. Under the Johnsons’ view, Section 1501 of the Code — requiring utilities to provide “adequate, efficient, safe, and reasonable service” — is inapplicable because Duquesne’s alleged misconduct consisted of voluntary, unregulated communications and omissions, not the provision of electrical service, which the PUC would otherwise have jurisdiction over. The Johnsons also stress the PUC’s remedial limits: the PUC does not have the power to award damages, nor can it adjudicate property rights. Therefore, according to the Johnsons, forcing them to litigate in an administrative forum that cannot provide the relief they seek is inefficient and inconsistent with precedent.

Finally, the Johnsons reject the notion that allowing trial courts to hear such claims would disrupt statewide regulatory uniformity. In their telling, this is an individualized dispute over alleged negligence affecting a single property, not a systemic challenge to utility service that requires the PUC’s technical expertise.

The PUC and Duquesne: “Service” Is More Than Keeping the Lights on

The PUC and Duquesne counter that the Commonwealth Court erred in its interpretation of the Public Utility Code, the PUC’s regulations and decades of well-worn precedent.  According to the PUC and Duquesne, Section 102 of the Public Utility Code defines “service” in “the broadest and most inclusive sense” to include “any and all acts done…by public utilities…to the public.” Under that definition, planned construction of an electric transmission line and communications related to siting that transmission line are not collateral to “service” — they are service. Therefore, according to Duquesne and the PUC, the PUC has primary jurisdiction to regulate.

The PUC and Duquesne further point to the Supreme Court’s decisions in Elkin v. Bell Telephone Co. and PPL Electric Utilities Corp. v. City of Lancaster, which they argue reaffirmed the PUC’s exclusive and primary jurisdiction over matters involving the reasonableness of utility service and, arguably, the notice for siting of utility facilities. Both the PUC and Duquesne argue that, absent the PUC’s primary jurisdiction over notice procedures and siting for transmission infrastructure buildout, unpredictable tort liability would ensue on a county-by-county basis. This could serve to burden courts of common pleas with complex utility litigation otherwise historically handled by the agency tasked with utility regulation. In turn, this would discourage utilities from transparently engaging with landowners regarding infrastructure projects.

The Stakes

Before the Supreme Court, the PUC and Duquesne have framed the appeal as a defense of the PUC’s institutional role. They ask the Court to reaffirm that communications integral to transmission‑line siting are part of utility “service,” pursuant to Section 102 of the Public Utility Code and, in turn, subject to the PUC’s exclusive jurisdiction, even when plaintiffs frame their pleadings in common‑law terms. The PUC and Duquesne also address a threshold jurisdictional argument: because the PUC’s order merely determined jurisdiction and held the case in abeyance without a final adjudication on the merits, the Commonwealth Court lacked appellate jurisdiction altogether. The Johnsons’ Supreme Court brief has not yet been filed but is expected to echo the points they have made previously.

The Supreme Court’s decision will echo beyond this specific dispute and transmission line project.  If the Commonwealth Court’s decision is affirmed, electric utilities may face common-law suits in multiple counties alleging various theories of negligence for the same project. These theories could extend to challenging notice practices, route selection communications, and any other aspect of early-stage infrastructure planning. Rather than the PUC evaluating these claims as part of its regular practice, individual county courts, judges and juries could define the standards governing those practices. This will likely create inconsistent utility obligations, delaying necessary infrastructure construction and deployment, and potentially driving up utility rates across the state due to increased utility litigation risk.

If the PUC’s position is upheld, the Court will reinforce the PUC’s role as the primary arbiter of what constitutes reasonable utility service, including how and when utilities communicate with affected landowners during the infrastructure siting process. Courts would retain their traditional role in evaluating common-law-based damages claims, but only after the PUC has addressed regulated utilities’ duties and compliance with the PUC’s service requirements. For utilities, regulators and landowners alike, the Court’s conclusion will shape how utility infrastructure projects are planned, communicated and contested going forward.